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Abstract 
In this research, we investigate several behavioral biases and build up optimal 
portfolios under the behavioral framework. Firstly, by assuming dynamics of loss-
averse coefficient and the reference point, we solve the dynamic programming prob-
lem numerically. We find out that our framework can help to explain the low demand 
of risky asset in the market with high equity premium. Secondly, we adopt addi-
tive utility theory (AUT) to deal with anomalies in reference-point-updating, and 
we identify a relationship between loss aversion and investment horizon. Thirdly, 
we revise Gomes' model and build up several models based on Friedman-Savage 
Utility Function (1948) and the Prospect Theory (1979). In the models, the effects 
of loss aversion and risk aversion on investment decision making are studied. The 
phenomenon of having portfolio insurance and gambling of a risk-averse investor 
is explained by the revised Gomes' model. Finally, we compare the results under 
different settings of mental accounting and discuss the possibility of making use 
of mental accounting to encourage risky assets investment. Wealth managers may 
make use of some behavioral finance theory to alter their clients' belief so as to align 
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Explicitly or implicitly, the standard finance theories are built on rational prefer-
ence, rational expectation, and some other assumptions about individual rationality. 
These rational assumptions allow us to establish an unified theoretical framework by 
a minimum number of tools. However, a criticism for all these rational assumptions 
is how appropriate they describe the real world. Are people making investment deci-
sions rationally? In the past few decades, academics and practitioners have realized 
that market and investors are not as rational as their common beliefs, even in the 
case for professional investors. Hence, practitioners and researchers strive to explain 
investment behaviors better and lead to a new field in financial study - behavioral 
finance. 
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Behavioral finance has discovered numerous anomalies mainly from the mid-
1960s. In this area, mounting evidence is found that implausible settings are often 
necessary to explain financial phenomena under the rational assumptions. As stated 
by Berstein (1996)[27], the evidence "reveals repeated patterns of irrationality, in-
consistency, and incompetence in the ways human beings arrive at decisions and 
choices when faced with uncertainty. “ In response to the difficulties faced by the 
standard paradigm, behavioral finance has also proceeded with attempts to incor-
porate psychological theories into finance on the theoretical side. It opens the door 
of financial modeling to human factors and analyzes what happens when we relax 
one or two aspects of individual rationality. 
A famous and perfect union of psychological insights and financial decision 
making is the prospect theory, developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) [8 . 
Under the prospect theory, value is calculated based on the concept of gains and 
losses from a reference point, rather than the absolute wealth level, in decision 
making. The concave part in the gain region and the convex part in the loss region 
of the value function are supported by psychological experiments. The special shape 
of the value function describes an interesting phenomenon: risk averse over gains and 
risk seeking over losses. The idea of gains and losses measured against a particular 
wealth level - the reference, is simple but significant. In reality, when people invest, 
they are very sensitive to the gains and losses with respect to their "buy price". 
The "disposition effect" - selling the winner and keeping the loser, is a well-known 
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behavior which is harmful to investment performance. 
Nowadays, investment advisory is a blooming industry. There are so many 
sophisticated tools in the wealth management industry, like different kinds of mu-
tual funds, structured fixed income and equity products, derivatives and alternative 
investments. Pompian [28] stated that "The reality of today's advisor-investor rela-
tionship demands a better understanding of individual investor's behavioral biases 
and an awareness of these biases when structuring investment portfolios. Advisors 
need to focus more acutely on why their clients make the decisions they do and 
whether their behaviors need to be modified or adapted to." When there is excess 
financial news and new investment opportunities in our everyday life, the investors 
can easily access the information and change their beliefs. If the investment advi-
sors can successfully understand the factors affecting the client's decision making 
and incorporate those biases in the portfolio construction or educate their clients to 
reduce the behavioral biases, the relationship between investment advisors and their 
clients will be strengthened considerably, and the advisors can enjoy the loyalty of 
clients. 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the implications of some com-
mon behavioral biases for investors. At the same time, suggestions for reducing 
the negative effects of behavioral biases are provided at the end of each chapter. 
The three main physiological features we will try to understand in this research are, 
namely, 1) Loss Aversion, 2) Risk Aversion, and 3) Mental Accounting. 
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In Chapter 2, we investigate the general investment behavior from a multi-
stage model under the utility function in prospect theory. In this multi-stage model, 
we set up dynamics for the reference point and the loss averse coefficient. Under this 
model setting, given a high loss aversion, investors will finally leave the stock market 
after staying for a few periods. This finding supports the fact that even a large 
equity premium exists in the stock market, most householders do not participate 
in the risky asset investment. Based on this result, we will try to consider a few 
investors' biases separately in the following chapters. 
In Chapter 3，we consider the optimal portfolio problem under the policy of 
constant rebalancing portfolio strategy. In this problem with a moving reference 
point, we adopt an additive utility function. For an investor with zero risk aversion, 
the result shows a high correlation between loss aversion and investment horizon. 
In Chapter 4，we consider a revision of the Gomes' model. Under the re-
vised Gomes' model, the demand function for the risky asset is discontinuous and 
non-monotonic, which is consistent with Gomes' work. However, the new demand 
function consists of three segments, representing three different optimal allocations 
under different surplus wealth, while Gomes' demand function consists of two seg-
ments only. 
In Chapter 5，we study the investment behavior of an investor possessing 
the value function in prospect theory under a two-risky-asset market setting. The 
result demonstrates a relationship between asset correlation and power of mental 
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accounting. 
In Chapter 6，we study again the two-risky-asset problem with the Friedman-
Savage utility function. The pattern of the demand functions is not consistent with 
general beliefs and worth further investigation. The effect of mental accounting 
under Friedman-Savage utility function is also studied in this chapter. 
1.2 Utility and Value Function 
1.2.1 Expected utility theory 
Daniel Bernoulli (1738) first proposed the expected utility model, and he used it to 
solve the St. Peterburg paradox - a lottery game with infinite expected payoff, but 
is only considered to have a small value.* The Bernoulli utility function (Figure 1.1) 
is concave throughout, which is consistent with uniform attitude toward risk. Later, 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) developed the expected utility theory based 
on Bernoulli utility, with the assumption of expected utility maximization in their 
formulation of game theory. Prom then on, expected utility maximization has been 
*In the game, the player pays a fixed fee to enter, and then a fair coin will be tossed repeatedly 
until a tail first appears to end the game. The pot starts at 1 dollar and is doubled every time a 
head appears. The player wins the pot when the game ends. The expected payoff of this game is 
infinite and, almost surely, the player wins. However, according to survey, the maximum amount 
that people will pay to enter this game is less than a hundred. 
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a dominant topic in economics and finance. The concave shape of the Bernoulli 
utility, which represents diminishing marginal utility of money, implies that utility 
maximizing investors will never participate in a "fair" game of chance, e.g., a game 
with equal probability of winning or losing a dollar. This kind of behavior is termed 
as "risk aversion". 
J / Z 
Dollars 
Figure 1.1: Bernoulli's Utility Function 
However, in the real world, people not only engage in a game with fair chance, 
but also in unfair games like lotteries. A uniform attitude towards risk is not applica-
ble in many cases. For example, it is inconsistent with the Friedman-Savage puzzle 
- a thorn in the side of the conventional expected utility theory. One example in 
the real world is that people gamble and buy insurance at the same time. When an 
individual buys insurance for a house he owns, he is accepting certain loss of a small 
sum (the insurance premium) in preference to the combination of a small chance of 
huge loss and a large chance of no loss. Put it in other words, he prefers certainty to 
uncertainty. On the other hand, when an individual gambles, like buying Mark Six, 
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he is subjecting himself to a large chance of losing a small amount, combined with a 
small chance of winning a large amount in preference to getting nothing surely. In 
this case, he prefers uncertainty to certainty. As stated by Friedman and Savage [5], 
"Whether or not individuals realize it and whether or not they take explicit account 
of the varying degree of risk in their choices, many decisions making in their real life 
are analogous to those that they make when they decide whether to buy insurance 
or to gamble." 
Friedman and Savage (1948) [5] offered a solution to the insurance lottery puz-
zle based on an utility function that features both the concave and convex portions 
(Figure 1.2). The concave portions are consistent with the purchase of insurance 
policies and the convex portion is consistent with the purchase of lottery tickets. 
Basically, the utility function consists of three segments. The two concave segments 
correspond to "qualitatively different socioeconomic levels", while the convex seg-
ment refers to the transition between levels. Under the Friedman-Savage setup, 
"increasing in wealth of the investor in his own class, but not out of that class, 
yields diminishing marginal utility, while increasing in wealth into a new class will 
give him a new social and economic status, and will yield increasing marginal util-
ity". The greater the possibility of achieving such qualitatively different statues is, 
the greater the possibility of the presence of gambling. 
Another implication from the Friedman-Savage set-up is the steep falling of 
utility when the wealth drops below certain level. Individuals in the society that are 
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close to the subsistence level of income should have a very high disutility of losing 
since losing might bring them to a starvation. In this case, gambling is discouraged 
and individuals may buy insurance to prevent this kind of disutility. This thinking is 
consistent with the Roy's (1952) [19] safety-first portfolio theory. Investors in Roy's 
(1952) safety-first portfolio theory aim to minimize Pr {W < W}, the probability 
of wealth falling below a certain level - the disaster level. An investor is trapped 
into ruin when his terminal wealth W falls short of the disaster level level 巫 .T h e 
disaster level can be treated as the subsistence level - the minimum wealth for the 
investors to sustain his living. This theory has been supported by empirical studies. 
/ . 
Dollnrs 
Figure 1.2: Friedman-Savage's Utility Function 
Markowitz's mean-variance portfolio (1952a) [14] is one of the three portfolio 
theories introduced in 1952. The mean-variance portfolio theory addresses the risk-
return relationship and introduces a way to calculate the optimal portfolio based on 
the expected return and variance of all risky assets in the market. However, it is also 
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the only one which is inconsistent with the Friedman-Savage puzzle. In the same 
year, Markowitz introduced the customary wealth theory (1952b) to deal with some 
unrealistic implications of the Friedman-Savage framework, and Roy introduced the 
safety-first theory (1952). These two theories are consistent with the Priedman-
Savage puzzle. 
Markowitz (1952b) [15] argued that only some Friedman-Savage investors will 
buy both insurance and gamble. He claimed that only those people with a certain 
wealth level that falls into a specific narrow region of the inflection points in the 
Friedman-Savage utility function buy both insurance and lottery tickets. Based on 
the Friedman-Savage utility function, individuals with a very low wealth level will 
never purchase lottery, while people with moderate wealth will not insure them-
selves against modest losses. To address these points, Markowitz (1952b) modified 
Friedman and Savage's utility function by adding one inflection point, resulting in 
a four segments value function. He named the new inflationary point as customary 
wealth, which is status quo wealth, usually current wealth. Figure 1.3 shows the 
Markowitz's Customary-Wealth Utility Function. 
1.2.2 Prospect Theory 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) [8] constructed the prospect theory based on the 
Markowitz's customary wealth theory and some of Allais' work. The prospect theory 
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Customary / 
Wealth \ � \ y 
Z Dollars 
Figure 1.3: Markowitz's Customary-Wealth Utlity Function 
states that "Values should be treated as a function in two arguments: the asset 
position that serves as a reference point, and the magnitude of the change (positive 
or negative) from that reference point". Consider a game in which the player has a 
probability p to gain x and a probability (1 — p) to lose y, where x > 0 and y > Q. 
We denote the game as y,l _ p). In the traditional expected utility framework, 
the player with initial wealth W and utility function U (.) evaluates his expected 
utility by calculating 
pU {W-j-x) + {l-p)U{W-y) (1.1) 
However, under prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky suggested that, in 
reality, a player will assign this game with the value of 
TT{j>)V[x) + 'K{l-p)V{-y) (1.2) 
where V (.) and tt (.) are the value function and the probability weighting function 
specified by the prospect theory, respectively. The gain/loss argument has been 
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supported by experimental evidence and is also consistent with the fact that our 
perception is more sensitive to changes than to the absolute level of brightness, 
temperature, loudness or taste. Let's consider the following experiment. 
Scenario 1 : In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 1,000. 
You are now asked to choose between A : (1000，0.5; 0’ 0.5) and B : (500,1). 
Scenario 2 : In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 2,000. 
You are now asked to choose between C : (-1000，0.5; 0，0.5) and D : (—500,1). 
The majority of experimental subjects chose B in the first scenario {B >- A) 
and chose C in the second scenario (C D). However, when viewed in terms of 
final states, they are contradictory, as 
A = (2000,0.5; 1000,0.5) = C and J5 = (1500’ 1) = D 
It can be observed that, from this example, the initial level does not affect 
the decision making process. The result is inconsistent with the traditional expected 
utility theory, in which utility is solely determined by the final wealth level and in 
regardless of the previous status. 
Secondly, the value function for changes of wealth is normally concave above 
the reference point and often convex below it, which indicates a risk averse in gain 
and risk seeking in loss. It can be illustrated by the following example. 
Scenario 3 : E : (6000,0.25) and F : (4000,0.25; 2000,0.25) 
Result from the majority of population: E ^ F 
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Scenario 4:G: (-6000,0.25) and H : (-4000,0.25; —2000，0.25) 
Result from the majority of population: G H 
By applying the value function, we have 
TT (.25)^(6000) < TT (.25) [？; (4000) + v (2000)] 
TT (.25) 7； ( -6000) > TT (.25) 4000)+?; ( -2000)] 
Hence, we have v (6000) < v (4000) + v (2000) and v ( -6000) > v ( -4000) + 
V (—2000)，which clearly indicates the value function is concave for gains and convex 
for losses. 
Thirdly, individuals are more sensitive to a dollar loss than a dollar gain 
- t h e so-called loss aversion. This idea is first introduced by Galanter & Plinter 
(1974), who stated that "The aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of 
money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same 
amount". It can be illustrated by the result of an experiment : I : {y, 0.5; —y, 0.5) 
y J : {x, 0.5; —X, 0.5) for X > y > 0. Making use of the value function, we have 
v(y) -hv (-y) > v(x) -hv (-x) 
Setting y = 0 yields v {x) < —v {—x). This loss-averse behavior implies a 
steeper course in the region of losses. 
To conclude, the proposed value function in prospect theory is (i) defined on 
the deviations from the reference point (gains vs losses); (ii) generally concave for 
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gains and convex for losses; (iii) steeper for losses than for gains. We can see that 
the proposed S-shaped value function (Figure 1.4) is steepest at the reference point, 
significantly different from Markowitz's customary wealth utility function which is 
relatively shallow near the customary wealth level. 
^：乙 
^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^  Gains 
Figure 1.4: Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory Value Function 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992) further proposed the functional form for the 
value function, namely 
a: > 0 
V (a;) = < for , 0 < a < 1,A > 1 (1.3) 
- A ( - x ) " r c < 0 
\ 
where 0 < a < 1 means that the function is concave over gains and convex over 
losses, and A > 1 indicates a greater sensitivity to losses than gains. 
Based on experimental data, Kahneman and Tversky (1992) [11] estimated 
the mean value of OL and A at o； = 0.88 and A = 2.25. The value of a = 0.88 
indicates that the value function is only mildly concave over gains and only mildly 
convex over losses, which implies that risk aversion is not very dominant. On the 
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other hand, the value of A = 2.25 suggests that individuals are substantially more 
sensitive to losses than gains. In this case, the disutility from a dollar loss is equal 
to the utility from a $2.25 gain. 
In our analysis for investor behaviors, we will mainly use the value function 
in the prospect theory and Friedman-Savage utility function with loss aversion, as 
they capture the two most significant psychological behaviors investors have - the 
risk aversion and loss aversion. Compared to the Friedman-Savage utility, the value 
function in the prospect theory is simpler and can be applied easily. On the other 
hand, the Friedman-Savage utility function is consistent with the Friedman-Savage 
puzzle. 
1.3 Mental Accounting 
Mental accounting, first introduced by Richard Thaler (1980) [22], is referred to 
the cognitive process that people code, categorize and evaluate economic outcomes. 
Mental accounting provides a foundation according to which decision makers set 
reference points for the accounts that determine gains and losses. The main idea 
is that decision makers tend to segregate different types of gambles into separate 
accounts, and then apply different utility functions or value function in the prospect 
theory to each account while ignoring possible interaction among them. 
According to Thaler [25], there are three main components in Mental Ac-
14 
counting Theory - Value Function, Transaction Utility and Non-Fungibility. 
Value Functions 
In rational behavior theory, the satisfaction level of an individual increases 
when his wealth increases, and decreases when his wealth goes down. The decision 
making process is based on the distribution of final wealth level. 
However, in mental accounting, we consider the utility level. Individuals may 
have a non-linear utility function, which exhibits risk aversion and loss aversion. 
Moreover, individuals may value their level of satisfaction based on gain/ loss rather 
than his absolute wealth level. Different individuals have different value judgments. 
This component also concerns the frequency with which accounts are evalu-
ated. Accounts can be balanced daily, weekly, yearly, and so on, and can be defined 
narrowly or broadly. 
Transaction Utility 
The transaction utility theory states that people not only get utility from an 
increase in wealth, but also from the transaction process. For any transaction, there 
are two values attached - acquisition value and transaction value. 
Acquisition value is the fair amount of money that one believes for physically 
acquiring the goods. Transaction utility is the value which one believes to have 
a good deal. If the price that one is paying is equal to the acquisition value, the 




In the standard finance, a dollar is a dollar. There are no labels on money, and 
individuals do not associate money with any specific tags. It is called the fungibility 
of money. However, in the mental accounting theory, money may become non-
fungible. People will often tag the money with their different pockets. An example 
is a savings account (or any deposit accounts) with a credit card account (or any 
credit accounts). Although a person has an outstanding balance on his credit card 
and has enough money in his savings account to cover it, he will not use the money 
in saving accounts to pay out the debt because the money is labeled as savings. As 
a result, having one saving account and one credit account may give the individual 
higher utility, because his/her "Saving" is higher. Another example is a necessity 
account with an entertainment account. In some situations, an individual may need 
some extra necessity. Since the extra money is associated with the entertainment 
account, which gives him/her a higher utility, he may be reluctant to spend the 
money on the necessity. 
Mental accounting theorists argue that people group their assets into a num-
ber of non-fungible mental accounts. One detailed application of mental accounting 
is the behavioral life cycle hypothesis by Shefrin & Thaler (1988). The behavioral 
life cycle hypothesis proposes that people mentally frame assets as belonging to 
current income, current wealth or future income and this has implications for their 
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behavior as the accounts are largely non-fungible and the marginal propensity to 
consume out of each account is different. 
1.3.1 Segregation vs Aggregation 
The value function in the prospect theory is defined over the net gain/loss, and is 
unidimensional. Under the mental accounting theory, the concave/convex shape of 
the value function creates an incentive for mental account manipulation. Individuals 
may take a portion of wealth from the gain account, which is concave, and put it into 
the loss account, which is convex. The overall utility increases because the gain in the 
increasing marginal return loss region outweighs the loss in the decreasing marginal 
return gain region. Consider the previous example of a necessity account with an 
entertainment account, if the individual considers the income spent on necessities is 
a gain, he may take a portion out and allocate it to luxurious spending. 
Richard Thaler (1985) [24] developed a model with two possible outcomes 
to examine mental accounting under the prospect theory. In his work, there are 
two ways to code a joint outcome {x, y). Here is the value function from the 
prospect theory. The outcomes could be valued jointly as v{x-{-y), which is denoted 
as integration, or be valued separately as ？; which is denoted as segregation. 
He considered four possible combinations: (i) multiple gains; (ii) multiple losses, (iii) 
mixed gain and (iv) mixed loss. 
1. Multiple Gains. Given a: > 0 and y � 0， s e g r e g a t i o n is preferred in 
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situations with multiple gains because of the concave value function in the gain 
region: •^v{y) > v(x-{-y). "Don't wrap all the Christmas presents in one box". 
Considering the multiple gains as many small gains gives a higher utility than as 
one big gain. 
2. Multiple Losses. Integration is preferred in situations with multiple losses 
because of the convex value function in the loss region: ？;(—x) + v(-y) < v(—x — y). 
Consider the multiple losses as one big loss gives a higher utility than as many small 
losses. Credit card is an example of integrating many small losses into one big loss 
so as to reduce the total disutility. 
3. Mixed Gain. With x > y > 0, the joint outcome {x — y) represents a mixed 
gain. In this case, we have ？;(a:) + v{—y)多 v{x — y). The integration/segregation 
decision depends on the value function's parameters (A,7), as well as the size of 
We know that v{x — y) > 0 since x - y > 0. On the other hand, it is likely 
that v{x) + v{—y) < 0 because of the existence of loss aversion. Therefore, for a 
mixed gain, integration should be a better coding. The behavior of cancelling losses 
by gains is commonly observed among individual investors. 
4. Mixed Loss. With Q < x < y, the joint outcome (rr — y) represents a net 
loss. Similar to the case of mixed gain, we have v{x) + v{—y) g v{x - y). For a 
small gain and a huge loss, it is likely that v{x) + v{—y) > v{x — y) and segregation 
is preferred. For example, with a joint outcome of ($10, -$1000)，because of the flat 
tail in the region of huge loss and a relatively steep value function in the region of 
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small gain, segregating the gain and loss is better for investors and it is called the 
"silver lining" principle. On the other hand, for a small gain and a not very huge 
loss, e.g., ($ 10, -$20), integration is more likely to be preferred. 
In order to verify the integrating/ segregating mental account principles, 
Thaler conducted an experiment with a sample of 87 students in an undergraduate 
statistic class in Cornell University^ The results supported his mental accounting 
principle. 
tThe experiment consists of four scenarios. In each case, two events occur in Mr. A's life and 
one event occurs in Mr. B's life. The students were asked to judge whether Mr.A or Mr. B is 
happier. 
1) Mr. A was given tickets to lotteries involving the World Series. He won $50 in one lottery 
and $25 in the other. Mr. B was given a ticket to a single, larger World Series lottery. He won 
$75. 
2) Mr. A received a letter from the IRAS saying that he made a minor arithmetical mistake 
on his tax return and owed $100. He received a similar letter the same day from his state income 
tax authority saying he owed $50. There were no other repercussions from either mistake. Mr. 
B received a letter from the IRAS saying that he made a minor arithmetical mistake on his tax 
return and owed $150. There were no other repercussions from either mistake. 
3) Mr. A bought his first New York State lottery ticket and won $100. Also, in a freak accident, 
he damaged the rug in his apartment and had to pay the landlord $80. Mr. B bought his first 
New York State lottery ticket and won $20. 
4) Mr. A's car was damaged in a parking lot. He had to spend $200 to repair the damage. On 
the same day car was damaged, he won $25 in the office football pool. Mr. B's car was damaged 
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Chapter 2 
Moving reference point with loss 
aversion 
We investigate how an investor reacts to his investment experience under the value 
function in prospect theory in this chapter. With the market setting of one risky 
asset and one risk free asset, we derive the optimal investment level by performing 
dynamic programming. 
2.1 Model Setup 
Consider an N - period model with one risky asset and one risk-free asset in the 
market. Each dollar invested in the risky asset has a probability p to go up by u 
and a probability 1 — p to go down by d. The investor starts with an initial wealth 
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level WQ and an initial loss averse coefficient A� . 
At each time step t = i, the investor invests QiWi (a portion of the total 
wealth) in the risky asset, where qi is the ratio of investment to the total wealth and 
Wi is the wealth level at time t — i. 
The wealth invested in the risky asset will experience either a gain or a 
loss, and the wealth not invested in the risky asset will be deposited into the bank 
account, earning a risk-free interest rate 77• 
At 亡二 i + 1 , the wealth level becomes: 
[qiU + (1 - qi)rf\ Wi with probability p, 
[qid + (1 - QiYf] Wi with probability 1 - p. 
\ 
We can obtain the expected value of Wi+i: 
E [VVi+i] = [qi {pu + {l-p)d) + i l - qi)rf] ( 2 . 1 ) 
In this chapter, we assume that investors use the following value function 
(Figure 2.1) to evaluate the outcomes. 
( 
{Wi+i -五 [ W • � ] ) i / 2 if > 
Ui+i {Wi+i) = (2.2) 
-XiiElWi+i] - Wi^ .y^ if H i^+i < 
\ 
where Aj measures the degree of loss aversion at time i + 1, and E [VKi+i] serves as 
the reference point. 
It is clear that function Ui^i (Wi+i) is concave in the domain of gain and 
convex in the domain of loss. We define gain as Wi+i — E[Wi+i] > 0，the wealth 
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larger than the expected wealth, and loss as Wi+i — E[Wi+i] < 0，the wealth less 
than the expected wealth. 
Utility r 
^^^^^^^^^^ E[w] w 
Figure 2.1: Prospect theory's utility function 
Intuitively, when an investor experiences a gain in his investment, he will be-
come less loss averse and vice versa. To capture this feature, we adopt the following 
dynamic: 
A � = m a x [A, * e—列〜广五1�il)/购’ 1] (2.3) 
Here, the value of P controls the adjustment speed of loss aversion > 0). Small 
(3 indicates that the investor's loss aversion reacts slowly to investment outcomes. 
When = 0，the loss averse coefficient is constant. In this case, the investor does 
not change his attitude towards loss. 
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A small value of A denotes a situation with a lower level of loss aversion. 
The above dynamics of the loss averse coefficient captures the loss appetite of the 
investor - the level of loss aversion decreases after realizing some gains; while the 
level of loss aversion increases when experiencing some losses. In our model, the 
value of A is always greater than one, i.e., the investor is more sensitive to losses 
than gains, no matter how good his investment experience is. If the investor places 
all his wealth into the riskless account, the loss aversion coefficient does not change 
because WI+i is always equal to E [VKI+i . 
Based on the wealth and the loss aversion dynamic equations, the system 
evolves in the way illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
t= 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = N 
Figure 2.2: Dynamics of the Wealth and Loss Aversion 
The problem can be solved by backward dynamic programming. In order 
to do it, we divide the wealth - loss aversion distribution into a fixed number of 
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elements. After i steps, the maximum value and minimum value of wealth 
and the maximum value and minimum value of the loss averse coefficient (A )^ can 
be obtained as follows: 
max[Wi] = Wqu^ 
min[Tyj = Wod' 
< 
min[Ai] = Aoe-( i -•-咖 
max[Ai] = Aoe•一句 i 
v 
For each stage i, given the maximum value and minimum value of the wealth 
as well as those of the loss averse coefficient, we construct the following M * M 
matrix, where M is the quantization parameter. 
^min • • • • ^max 
W • 
‘ ‘ m m • • • • 
. . .{W, A ) . . . 
W '''max • • . . . 
After having the matrix for each stage, we use the backward dynamic pro-
gramming method to decide the way for an investor to maximize his utility at the 
final stage. Suppose that at each stage, the investor can only invest a portion of his 
total wealth in the stock market for q = 0.1，0.2,0.3,...’ 1.0. Now, our goal is to find 
the optimal responses � ， i = 0,1,…，N — 1. 
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First, consider i = N — 1, 
E[UM{WN,XN-uqN-i)] = piWN-iqN-i{l-p) 
—XN-1 (1 - P) {WM-iqN-IP {U - (2.4) 
For each element in the matrix with different pair of W^- i and A^v-i? we first 
evaluate the expected utility Um for Qn-i = (0.1,0.2,0.3,..., 1.0). 
We then choose the q*N-i which maximizes the expected utility t/yv, 
Qn-i { W n - u Ayv-i) = m a x { E [Un (VI^ n, ^ N-uqN-i)]} (2.5) 
QN-1 
After getting the result for i = TV - 1，we perform the dynamic programming 
to identify optimal strategies for i = iV — 2, / / — 3,..., 2,1. 
We define the benefit-to-go function: 
• N -
B:{Wi,Xi)= max E V] Xk-uQk-i)， (2.6) 
.k=i+l � 
which satisfies the following recursion: 
B* {Wi,Xi) = maxE [Ui+i W + i , +5；+! . (2,7) 
<h 
In this problem, the objective function is to maximize the expectation of the 
total utility gained from all stages, 
• N ‘ 
B*o{Wo,Xo)= ma^ E T U k {WkAk-i^Qk-i) (2.8) 
.k=l � 
26 
2.2 Simulation Results 
We use the following market parameters to generate the solution for a five-stage 
problem: u = 1.1，d = 0.9, p = 0.7, Rf = 1.02，Wq : : 100，/? = 1, Aq = 1.5 and 
M = 10. 
Figure 2.3 shows that the investor will choose to have minimum investment 
permanently [qi = 0) after he/she stays in the stock market for several periods. The 
loss aversion dynamic causes the investor to become more loss averse after he/she 
experiences a loss, and thus makes him to hold less risky positions in general terms. 
Our result shows that the investor will keep investing only in the case that he/she 
wins continuously in the risky asset and his/her loss aversion keeps decreasing. 
The value of P does not play an important role in this problem. For different 
values of /? > 0, the above trading pattern preserves - the investor will have a large 
investment in risky asset only in the case that he never experiences a loss. For /3 = 0 
(i.e. constant loss averse), we will discuss it in the next chapter. 
Moreover, if more time steps are considered, the trading pattern is similar. 
A ten-stage and a twelve-stage problems are considered, and we found that the 
numerical solutions are consistent with the five-stage problem. Here, we show the 
simpler problem - the five-stage one, for illustration. 
The value of loss averse coefficient A suggested by prospect theory is 2.25, 
which implies that the magnitude of utility decrease associated with a dollar loss is 
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T=1 T=2 T=3 T=4 
OJB IC 
C H O C 
\ 
I 0.1 K T 
0.1 
0.1 
Figure 2.3: The value of q* at each node 
equal to that of the utility increase from $ 2.25 gain. Under loss aversion, investors 
request some equity premium as an incentive to hold risky assets. Even a positive 
equity premium does exist in most market situations, when the loss aversion is large 
enough, investors will choose to avoid uncertainties in most cases by putting their 
wealth into the risk-free account to earn the risk-free rate. If we set Aq = 2.25 in 
our model, the investor will have minimum investment in every stage, i.e. Qi = 0.1 
for i 二 0，1，...，_/V — 1. The reason is that the investor is too loss averse to have 
investment in the risky asset. 
The simulation result only gives a trend for the investment behavior under 
the framework with changing reference point and loss aversion. As the dynamic 
problem consists of two updating processes for both the wealth and the loss aversion 
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coefficient, it is hard to obtain a closed-form solution. Moreover, the result is not 
accurate because of several reasons: 
1) Although accuracy can be improved by increasing the number of nodes. 
However, the computational time increases exponentially with the M. 
2) As the number of periods N increases, the ranges of both W and A increase. 
Because of the dimension of the discretization matrix is fixed as M * M, when we 
discretize the states at every stage i, the intervals increase with i. Large error will 
thus occur if the time horizon under consideration is long. 
3) The investor is only allowed to choose qi = (0.1,0.2,0.3,..., 1.0) in our 
model. 
The model, however, gives us some ideas on how hard the problem can be and 
demonstrates some trading patterns. In the following chapters, we will investigate 
the investors' biases separately with some simplified model settings. 
29 
Chapter 3 
Constant Rebalancing Portfolio 
with Additive Utility 
In this chapter, we start with a simplified model and investigate the case without 
risk aversion and with a constant loss aversion. We develop the additive utility 
theory (AUT) to avoid the anomalies in reference point updating models. With this 
simplification, we are able to derive the optimal portfolio allocation under the policy 
of constant rebalancing portfolio. 
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3.1 Model setting 
We start to consider the value function in the prospect theory of the following general 
form: 
， 
{Wt - rt广 iiw> r\’ 
Ut = < 
- Wt)'' if V^ t < lY 
\ 
where Wt and Ft are the wealth and the reference point at time t, respectively. In 
this chapter, we use the risk averse (7) and loss averse (A) coefficient suggested by 
Kahneman and Tversky : (7, A) = (0.88,2.25). 
Assumed that there are only one risky asset and one risk-free asset in the 
market, the investor can choose to invest a portion of his wealth (At) into the risky 
asset, and deposits the remaining wealth into the bank to earn a risk-free rate. The 
following equations govern the movement of the risky asset: 
( 
u with probability p, 
R = 
d with probability I — p. 
With one risky asset and one risk-free asset in the market, the wealth distri-
bution is the same as in the previous chapter. 
f 
[AtU + (1 — At) 77] Wt with probability p, 
= 
[Atd + (1 - At) rf] Wt with probability 1 — p. 
In this problem, we use an additive utility function with incremental utility: 
{Wt - Tt^ ifW> Tt, 
= (3.1) 
- W t - Wt)'y if VKi < r^. 
\ 
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The objective function of the portfolio selection problem studied in this chap-
ter is: 
max { s Z ^ U t ( W t , r t ) I 
s.t Wt+i = [rf+A{R-rf)]Wt 
(3.2) 
where Wt^  and A^  are the wealth level, the reference point and the loss averse 
coefficient at time t, respectively. On the other hand, the values of 9 and /3 control 
the pace of reference point and loss aversion adjustment. 
In order to simplify the problem, we set ^ = 0 and 7 = 1 to have a risk-
neutral problem with a constant loss aversion, and the value of 9 is assumed to be 
equal to 1. In this problem, we consider a constant rebalancing portfolio strategy, 
i.e. AT = A, for all stages, and the reference point at each stage is chosen to be the 
wealth in the previous stage, Tt+i = Wt. 
One important feature of the new model is that it removes the concave-convex 
shape of the value function. It can be justified based on the following two reasons, 
if the gain and loss in each stage is small [u and d are close to 1). Firstly, the 
suggested value of 7 is 0.88, which means that the value function is only slightly 
concave and convex near the reference point. Secondly, as we update the reference 
point at each stage, it is expected that the wealth will not deviate significantly from 
the reference. 
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The portfolio selection problem now becomes 
max | 
s.t. 14/^ +1 = [rf+A {R - Tf)] Wt. 
3.1.1 Additive Utility Theory (AUT) 
In this problem, we adopt an additive utility function which adds up all the marginal 
utilities over all time periods. The main reason is that the use of updating reference 
points will result in unrealistic solutions if we do not consider the additive utility 
function. Let's consider a simple example: a player has an initial wealth $10 and he 
plays a game for 10 times, in which he can win or lose a dollar with equal probability. 
Let's assume the payoff for the game is as follows: 
(1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,-1). 
Using the utility function given by equation (3.1), we know that the reference 
point at stage 9 is updated to $19. Therefore, if we consider the marginal utility of 
the 10th game only, the utility resulted from all 10 games is —A. In this case, the 
player incurs a negative utility while his overall gain is $8，which is not consistent 
with our daily life experience. 
Therefore, it is plausible to assume an additive utility function, which adds 
up the marginal utilities in all stages. Additive utility theory (AUT) helps to remove 
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anomalies in reference-point-updating models. 
3.2 Analysis 
At t = T — 1, the expected utility of the problem is: 
E[d.UT\WT-i\ = {p [VF+A {u - r / ) - 1 ] - A (1 - p) [1 - rj-A {d - rj)]} WT-I 
={AH-^K)WT-U (3.3) 
where 
H = p ( u - r / ) - A ( l - p ) {rf-d), (3.4) 
K 三 [ p + A ( l - p ) ] ( r / - l ) . (3.5) 
At Z = T — 2，the expected wealth of WT-\ is: 
E[WT-I\WT-2\ 二 五 — r / ) l 
= { p [rf-^A (u - rf)] + (1 - ri [vf+A {d - r / ) ] } Wt-2 
= { { l - A ) r f + AG}WT-2 . (3.6) 
where 
G = pu-\- {1-p)d. 
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Hence, the expected utility at time T (i.e., AUt-i + AUt) given Wt-2 is, 
E [AUt-IAUT\WT-2] = E[AUT-I\WT-2] + E[AUT\WT-2] 
=(AH + K) Wt-2 + (AH + K) E [WT-I\WT-2\ 
={AH + + [(1 -A)rf-\- AG]} (3.7) 
In order to simply the notation, set the follow 2 identities: 
• 
f{A) = AH-^K, 
< (3.8) 
g{A)三(1 - A) rf-{- AG. 
\ 
Then, we can get a nice form of the expected utility for different time horizons, 
“ 2 -
E = / ⑷ + " ⑷ （ 1 + P ⑷ ) } W t - 3 ’ ( 3 . 9 ) 
_ i = 0 -
• 3 • 
E = f{A) {1 + g{A) (1 + g{A){l + 5(A))} M/t-4. (3.10) 
-i=0 . 
3.3 Results 
For an N- period model, we can get the expected utility at the final stage by per-
forming the above iterative procedure. Given the initial wealth and under the policy 
of a constant rebalancing portfolio, the expected utility is a polynomial of the de-
cision making variable (斗 To have a better understanding of the problem, we 
illustrate the solution from our numerical experiments. The numerical solutions are 
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Figure 3.1: The time horizon needed to encourage investment. Rf 二 1.05，u = 1.3， 
d = 0.9. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot the least number of investment periods with which 
an investor will invest all of his wealth into the risky asset against the loss averse 
coefficient A. 
Based on this model, we can see that the larger value of A, the longer in-
vestment horizon for investors to have an incentive for investment. Moreover, for a 
slightly larger expected return (changing the value of u from 1.30 to 1.31), the en-
tirely graph shift downwards. It indicates that a high expected return can encourage 
risky investment, in terms of the significant reduction in investment time horizon. 36 
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Figure 3.2: The time horizon needed to encourage investment. R^ = 1.05，u = 1.31, 
d = 0.9. 
lambda (lower expected return) lambda (higher expected return) 
1.65 1.7 1.75 1.8 1.85 1.9| 1.65 1.7 1.75 1.8 1.85 1.9 
i 0 0 0 0 ^ 1 i 0 0 0 o 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
3 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
4 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
g- 5 1 1 0.956 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
w 6 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.94 0 
I 7 1 1 1 0.459 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
P 8 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.786 
9 1 1 1 1 0.367 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I I 1 1 1 1 1 0.364 1 1 1 1 1 1 
12 1 1 1 1 1 0.793 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I 13丨 1 1 1 1 1 l| 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Figure 3.3: The relationship between investment portion with different time horizion 
and loss aversion 
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3.4 Summary 
Prom the above results, as an investor becomes more loss-averse, a longer investment 
horizon is needed before taking a full investment decision. Therefore, loss aversion 
discourages the investment in risky asset. 
On the other hand, the theoretical time horizon required largely depends on 
the expected return of the risky asset. A slightly higher expected return can reduce 
the required time horizon significantly. It has been observed that when the value of 
u increases from 1.3 to 1.31, the required investment horizon is shortened. 
As a wealth manager, it is good to educate investors to consider a long 
investment horizon. Because of the high equity premium in the real market, investing 
a large portion in the stock market not only allows investors to attain a high utility, 
but also results in a high expected final wealth level. 
Here are some advices for wealth managers to combat investor's biases. 
1. Recognize that the high equity premium can help investor to achieve the 
goal of wealth accumulation. 
2. Recognize that the loss aversion is a hurdle in the real world, which 
discourages risky investment. Wealth managers can try to alter investors' belief and 
reduce their loss aversion. 
3. Recognize the power of time. Both literature and investment professionals 
point out that the "buy and hold strategy" and long investment horizon consider-
38 
ation are useful to enhance investment return. Here, from the behavioral finance 
perspective, we also suggest that considering a long investment horizon can reduce 
the effect of loss aversion, which in turn enhances investment performance. 
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Chapter 4 
Revision of Gomes' Work 
In this chapter, we revisit the problem studied by Gomes [7]. We adopt the same 
marketing setting and value function as in Gomes's work, but make a small change 
in the dynamics of the reference point. We obtain, however, new results different 
from the Gomes's - there exist more than two trading strategies. 
4.1 Background 
In the previous chapter, even for a simplified prospect theory with no risk aversion, 
we still cannot find a close-form solution. In this chapter, we will turn our focus to 
study a more complicated and more realistic utility function - the Friedman-Savage 
Utility Function. In order to facilitate our study of investor's behavior, and because 
most investors in the market possess myopic behaviors, we will consider a one-period 
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investment horizon in this chapter. 
Francisco J. Gomes [7] studied the optimal portfolio allocation behavior of 
a loss-averse investor in "Portfolio Choice and Trading Volume with Loss-Averse 
Investors (2005)". In the paper, he presented a model of portfolio choice and 
stock trading volume with loss-averse investor under constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) utility and Friedman-Savage utility function. 
The results of Gomes can be summarized as follow: . 
1. The demand function for risky asset is discontinuous and non-monotonic. 
2. The optimal asset allocation depends on the surplus wealth. Different sur-
plus levels may lead the investor to have completely different decisions. Specifically, 
there are two strategies and the switching between the strategies depends on both 
the investor's preferences and the equity premium. 
3. As wealth arises beyond a certain level, investors follow a generalized 
portfolio insurance strategy, which is consistent with the disposition effect. 
4. For a low level of surplus and negative surplus, the investor will not follow 
the generalized portfolio insurance rule and start to invest a lot (gambling) because 
the rule is associated with a very high cost when the surplus wealth is small. 
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Consider the Friedman-Savage utility function in the following form, 
(晰’r) = l XV, = - a I E I ^ i f ] y < i y < r , (4.i) 
\ L -
where W is the wealth level, F is the reference point, and 巫 is the disaster level. 
The Friedman-Savage utility function consists of three segments. The first 
two regions are similar to the value function in prospect theory. The additional 
segment for wealth under a disaster level is concave in nature, which implies 
that the investor becomes risk averse again when his wealth falls below a certain 
level. The disaster level identifies the level of wealth below which the utility 
function becomes concave again, which will be denoted as the disaster level from 
now onwards. 
The reference point F plays an important role in this problem because it is 
the wealth level that an investor measures his current surplus. Gomes suggested 
that the dynamic of reference point is a linear combination of the previous reference 
point and the current wealth level, which is given below with 0 G [0,1). 
= RFTT-I + eWt. (4.2) 
However, when an investor evaluates his gain/loss, it does not make sense 
that the reference point is a function of the current wealth. An alternative treatment 
to evaluate the gain/loss at time t should be to compare his current wealth Wt with 
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a reference point which is generated based on all information up to time ^ — 1. 
Therefore, we change the dynamic of the reference point to the following form: 
Ft = (1 - 9) RfVt-i + eRfWt-i. (4.3) 
Now, the reference point (Ft) is a linear combination of the previous reference 
point ( r V i ) and previous wealth (Wt-i). The value of 9 controls the pace of reference 
point adjustment. The reference point is also adjusted by the risk-free rate Rf for 
every period. Even when the stock price remains unchanged, it is plausible that 
whenever an investor cannot earn a riskless return, he will classify the situation as 
a loss. 
The market setting of this problem is the same as the one in Gomes' work 
- there are only one risky asset and one risk-free asset in the market. The investor 
can choose to invest a portion of his wealth (Q;WI) into the risky asset, and put 
the remaining wealth into a bank to earn a risk-free rate. The following equations 
govern the movement of the risky asset: 
( 
•R+ with probability 0.5 
Ri = 
R~ with probability 0.5 
with 
R+ > Rf > R-, 
R+ -{-R- > 2Rf. 





s,t. W2 = [a/?2 + (l-Q；) Rf]Wu 
r2 = { l - 9) Rfri-\-9RfWi. 
We denote further 14^2+ and W2 as follow: 
W^ = [ a i ? + + ( l - a ) Rf]Wu 
W2 = [Q;i?-+(l-a) Rf]Wi. 
4.2 Portfolio Allocation with zero surplus wealth 
Zero surplus wealth refers to the situation where an investor is out of the market and 
is currently contemplating whether to invest some portion of his wealth in stocks. 
In this case, the initial reference point is equal to the initial wealth, i.e., Wi = Fi. 
For Wi = Fi, we have 
W2-r2 = a{R2- Rf)Wi. (4.5) 
If W2 > W., the expected utility is given by: 
E [vy = ^VG [W^] + 臺 [ H / ^ - ] . (4.6) 
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In order to determine the value of a that maximizes the expected utility, we 
calculate the first order derivative of E [V2] in (4.6), 
™ = [ (把 -〜广 7 -HRf-丑-广1对” 
Then, we have a necessary and sufficient condition for > 0，which is: 
- RfY-i >X{Rf- R-y-^ . (4.7) 
If the above condition is satisfied, the investor will increase the value of a 
until poor investment return brings him to the region VBL- In this case, the expected 
value is given by: 
E pl^ l = il/G M ] + \Vbl [W2—] . (4.8) 
Differentiating (4.8) once, the optimal value of a is given by the following 
equation implicitly: 
w^- - r j 一’ - Rf) = (丑/ —丑一）• (4.9) 
Solving (4.9) yields 
a {R+ -Rf)]"" {R-^ -Rf) = [Rf - a { R f - [Rj - R'), 
a{R+-Rf) = fR-^-RfV^'' 
Rf-a{Rf-R-) — \Rf-R-^ . 




K = (R^-RF\ 
\RF - R- J 
However, it is believed that the condition (4.7) is unsatisfied in most cases 
because the equity premium is not high enough. Therefore, in most cases, the 
investor will not invest when his initial wealth is at the reference point. (The value 
of A and 7 suggested by Tversky and Kahneman are 2.25 and 0.12，respectively.) 
Moreover, in order to satisfy the condition that payoff in poor investment 
return brings the investor to the bad loss region ^ from (4.7)，there is a 
constraint for the value of a*, 
* TF - W/WI 
a* > — ~ 三 a 
Tf — a 一 
where a is the switching point. 
In the following sections, we will derive the optimal value of a for different 
surplus wealth. In each case, we will check the feasibility of a* by examining whether 
the payoff falls into the corresponding range, without stating the switching point 
explicitly. If a* is not feasible, we will abandon that solution. 
4.3 Portfolio Allocation with Negative Surplus 
Consider the case that an investor has a negative initial surplus, which is higher 
than the disaster level < Wi < Fi). For a small value of a, it is expected that 
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the terminal wealth will still be below the reference point. Therefore we have: 
� / ri � 1 
T 2 - W 2 = R f { 1 - e) I - 1 ] - a i R 2 - R f ) m . (4.11) 
The investor's expected utility, for a small value of a，is given by: 
E[V2] = ^XVL + [H/2-] (4.12) 
( / Pi \ \ 1 — 1 
-\-(Rf{l-e)l-^-l]-a(R--Rf)] Wl"". 
\ V^ i^ / 乂 」 
Taking the first order derivative, we have: 
dE [1^2： 
da 
= \ [(It — ^ i V (丑+ - - (r2 - w r 厂 [ R j - i r ) ] w ' r 
二 -(1-0)1-'^ (丑+ — RF) 
— 2 [_ ( " , ( 1 - 0 ) ( 歲 - 1 ) - — 
(丑/ 一 R - � w ^ - ^ 
{RF (1 - 0 ) ( 歲 — 
We can see that the first order derivative is an increasing function of a. 
Therefore, the investor will keep increasing the risky investment until the terminal 
wealth leaves the region W < Wo. < F^ (the small loss region). The optimal solution 
for the problem depends on the equity premium and the disaster level. Now, we 
separate the problem into several cases. 
Case 1: 
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If the initial wealth level is well above the disaster level, the investment will 
bring the wealth above in good state { W ^ � [ 2 ) and the wealth remains in small 
loss region in bad state < W2 < � 2 ) . Thus, the expected utility of the investor 
is 
E[V2] = ivb [W+] + [VK2-] (4.13) 
Setting the first order derivative equal to zero, we have: 
™ =臺 [ ( w ? — r 2 广 一 i ? � - A (r, — w r 厂 ( H 广 / r ) ] HZ广=0’ 
FR'--RF\ = / r s - H / ^ T 
\RF-R-J 二 V W ^ y ， 
= 乂广(丑+ —丑/)-丑 / ( i_ 約 (乾 - 1 ) 
�Rf - ) 一 a{Rf-R-) + Rf{l-e)l^-l)' 
Solving for a yields the optimal trading strategy given by: 
H (X-^'-'K + 1) 
a* = ^ 厂 , )- ’ (4.14) 
where 
H = R f { l - e ) >1 . (4.16) 
Case 2: 
If the initial wealth level is just above the disaster level, the investor will 
experience a heavy loss which makes his wealth below the disaster level {W2 <W) 
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when the investment return is R: If the return is i?+，the wealth with be in small 
loss region (H^ < W2 < r? ) . The expected utility is given by: 
E[V2] = \\VL + \VBL (4.17) 
二 - - (！ ^丨厂厂 W2+)i” 
11 [ ( ^ 2 " ) ' " ' MQi—7 I 1 
2 1 1 — 7 1 — 7 1 — 7 {‘ 
Setting the first order derivative equal to zero gives rise, 
™ = \ [A ( R ^ - (I?-^ - Rj) - {Rf - I ? - ) ] w r = 0 , 
fR-^-RfV/-^ = 入 丑 / (I —約 
一 R-) — Rf-a{Rf- R-) . 
For this situation, the optimal value of a* is given by: 
a* = ^ ！- . (4.18) 
Case 3: 
Last but not least, the investor may decide to invest a large amount in the 
risky asset, so that the terminal wealth in good state will be above the reference 
point {W2 > � 2 ) and the terminal wealth in bad state will be below the disaster 
level {W2 < W) . The solution is given implicitly by (4.9). 
We have: 
[R'^ -Rf) = [^2"]''' [Rf-R~). 
Vi?/ - R-) — Rf-a(Rf-R-) , 
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For an initial wealth level that is not equal to the initial reference point, the 
solution is given by: 
= KRf + H 
4.4 Portfolio Allocation with Positive Surplus 
Finally, for the case with positive initial surplus (i.e., Wi > 1\) , W^ > r? and 
W2 > � 2 will be true if a is small. 
For Wi > Fi, 
W2-T2= [a (i?2 - Rf) + Rf{l- 0) (1 - 会 V P ^ i . (4.20) 
The expected utility is given by: 
E[V2] = - V b [ 对 ] + 臺Vg [晰2一] (4.21) 
二 丢 六 [ ( 对 - 厂 2 广 + (恢2- — r ,广 : . 
Setting the first order derivative equal to zero, we have: 
二 i {(H/,^ - r,) - R,) - (M/3- - r^) (i?/ - R-)} w'r = 0, 
(R^-RjV^' — " / ( I 一… 
— RF{l-e) ( l - ^ ) - a 仇-R-). 
The optimal trading strategy a* is given by: 
a* = 0) ( 1 - 杂 ) ( 把 — 〜 ( 二 打 ( 调 
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With a positive initial surplus, W^ will be always greater than the reference 
point. However, for a larger value of a, it is possible that the wealth W f will fall 
below the reference point (W^ < W^ < Fg) or below the disaster level in the worst 
case {W2 <W). 
After considering the potential gain and loss, investor may choose to invest 
a large amount into the stock market, which, in turn, may force him to leave the 
positive surplus region in the case of bad return. 
4.5 Numerical Results 
After considering different possible situations and deriving solutions for all different 
cases, we can test if our result matches the one proposed by Gomes. Here, we 
assume that an investor chooses the optimal risky asset investment a* to maximize 
his expected utility. In the following situations, the market parameters used are: 
R+ = 1.2’ R- = 0.9, Rf = 1.05, W = 10 and Fi = 30; and the parameters of utility 
function used are given by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) prospect theory, i.e., 
(A, 7) = (2.25’ 0.12). In our discussion, we investigate the optimal trading strategies 
for the initial wealth higher than the disaster level. If the initial wealth is below the 
disaster level, the investor is assumed to go bankruptcy and his behavior is not in 
the scope of our discussion. 
Figures 4.1 to 4.4 plot the expected utility with different values of 6. Recall 
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Figure 4.1: Utilities level under different invesment strategies (0 = 0) 
that r2 = (1 — 9) RfTi + 6RfWi, a larger value of 9 represents a faster reference 
point updating. For a large value of 6, the investor forgets his "investment history" 
rapidly, and considers the expected utility less dependent on the previous reference 
point. We can expect that, in this situation, the utility will be lower with positive 
initial surplus wealth and higher with negative initial surplus wealth because the 
investor forgets his previous gain and loss. 
In the figures, U represents the utility with zero risky investment. For an 
investment strategy a* which makes W2 > [2 {W2 in the VG region) and W2 < W 
{W2 in the VBL region), the expected utility is denoted by the line U {VG + VBL). 
The lines U {VG + VL), U {VL + VBL) and U {VG + VG) are defined in a similar 
manner. 
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Figure 4.2: Utilities level under different invesment strategies {9 = 0.2) 
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Figure 4.4: Utilities level under different invesment strategies {0 = 0.6) 
Prom the figures, it can be observed that the results are consistent with our 
expectations. The expected utilities decrease in the gain region and increase in the 
loss region as the value of 9 increases from 0 to 0.6. The reason is that the investor 
is updating his reference point in a faster pace to comfort himself. 
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 plot the optimal portfolio allocation under Gomes' 
framework and the revised Gomes' framework for different values of 6 respectively. 
The re-axis is the initial wealth level (P^i) and the ？/-axis is the best investment 
strategy (a). We can see that the investment strategy depends on the initial wealth 
level and the values of 6 do not affect the patterns of trading strategies much. Here, 
optimal trading strategy under Gomes' model consists of two segments, while the 
strategy under revised Gomes' model consists of three segments. 
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Figure 4.5: The best trading strategies for different values of 9 under Gomes' model 
By examination, we can see that the function of optimal strategy is discontin-
ued. Below a certain wealth level, the investor becomes more and more risk seeking 
and will pour all of his money into the risky asset. If borrowing is allowed, he will 
invest as much as he can until no more financial support can be found. In the gain 
region, we can see the investor is loss averse and follows the generalized portfolio 
insurance rule. In order to avoid the wealth falls below the reference point, the 
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Figure 4.6: The best trading strategies for different values of 6 under revised Gomes' 
model 
4.5.1 Gomes' Work 
If the reference point dynamic follows Gomes' setup (i.e. [2 = (1 — 6) Rfl\ -\-9W2), 
we cannot get the analytical solution. We use the same market parameters to 
generate the numerical solution. The following numerical solutions are generated by 
examining the expected utility for a = 0,0.1,0.2’ …’ 10. 
We can see that, under the Gomes original model, the demand function also 
consists of three segments. The reason why Gomes derived a 2 segments demand 
function is that he missed the expected utility combination of E [V2] = ^Vg + 
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Figure 4.7: The best trading strategies for different values of 6 under Gomes' model 
4.6 Summary 
Figure 4.6 plots the demand curve for loss-averse investors with different values 
of 9. The optimal asset allocation largely depends on the surplus wealth. Under 
different surplus levels, the investor makes completely different decisions. There are 
three strategies, rather than two suggested by Gomes, and the switching between 
the strategies depends on both the investor's preferences and the equity premium. 
The investment behaviors show a similar pattern for different values of 
which can be classified as three stages. 
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Firstly, for the most right region where the initial wealth is higher than the 
reference point, the investor follows the generalized portfolio insurance (GPI)* rule. 
The more positive the surplus wealth, the less risk averse the investor is, and hence 
the higher the risk exposure (investment). As the surplus wealth goes to zero, the 
optimal risky position also converges to zero. 
Secondly, with a small negative surplus wealth (i.e. initial wealth just below 
the reference point), the investor increases the risk exposure when his surplus wealth 
becomes more and more negative. This segment is not found in Gomes' work, and 
it suggests an increasing risk seeking behavior as the wealth falls just below the 
reference wealth level. 
Thirdly, with a large negative surplus wealth (i.e. the initial wealth is well-
below the reference point), but still above the disaster level, we can observe a gam-
bling behavior. Our results show that the investor is extremely risk-loving in this 
region and incurs a large amount of debt to support his gambling. 
I 
*This terminology came from Leland 1980 
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Chapter 5 
Mental Accounting under Value 
Function in the Prospect Theory 
In this chapter, we study the investment behavior of an investor with a flexibility in 
mental accounting. 
5.1 Cognitive dissonance 
The book titled "Behavioral Finance and Wealth Management - How to Build Op-
timal Portfolios That Account for Investor Bias" [28] discusses an investor's bias 
termed cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance encompasses the response that 
arises as people struggle to harmonize cognitions and thereby relieve their mental 
discomfort. The investor may choose to change their beliefs, change their actions or 
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change their action perceptions. 
In this chapter, we assume that the investor will alter his/her way of mental 
accounting to increase their utility when he is experiencing a gain, and comfort 
himself when he is experiencing a loss. We expect that the mental accounting 
segregation/ aggregation can encourage the risky asset investment. 
5.2 Market Setting 
In this chapter, we assume that there are two risky assets (^i, S2) in the market. 
The total return of risky asset 1 (<Si) is given as follows, 
Ui with probability 
= < 
di with probability 
\ 
Same as above, the total return of risky asset 2 {S2) is given as follows: 
U2 with probability 
R2= I 
d2 with probability 
\ 
The following table shows the correlation-embedded probability distribution 





Si-move Up 0.25 (1 + p) 0.25(1 - p ) 
Down 0.25 (1 - p) 0.25 (1 + p) 
We assume that S2 has both higher expected return and variance than 5i, 
i.e., 
U2 > Ui and d2 < d, 
E (RI) = FI, < E {R2) = 
Var {Ri) = al< Var = cr!. 
Under this market condition, the investor with initial wealth Wi will choose to 
invest aWi into <Si，pWi into S2 and deposit the remaining wealth {1 - a — l3)Wi into 
the riskless account, which earns him a risk-free rate 77. If a + > 1, the investor 
borrows to invest. The portfolio return is given by: 
RP = ARI + /3R2-^(L-A- /3) RF. (5 .1 ) 
5.3 Single Mental Account 
The 3-segment Friedman-Savage utility function is crucial in the one risky asset 
problem to avoid unreasonable infinite investment. In the 2-risky-asset problem 
studied here, we use the 2-segment prospect theory value function and add a bor-
rowing limitation. At first, we examine the case of mental account aggregation, in 
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which the investor has only one mental account to evaluate his investment portfolio. 
The initial wealth of the investor is denoted as Wi, and the final wealth level is 
denoted as VK2. In this problem, we set the reference point as the product of the 
initial wealth and the risk-free rate (F = R/Wi). 
The prospect theory value function is given by: 
( 
{W2 - R f W i y for W2 > RfWu 
[/ = < 
- A (RfWi - W2y for W2 < RfWi. 
\ 
The utilities associated with different combinations are: 
Uuu = [a -Rf) + (3 (购 — R f ) y Wl (5.2) 
/ 
[a (wi - / ? / ) + / ? {d2 - R f W y^i for a ( u i 队 - R f ) > 0， 
Uud = 
-X [—a {ui -Rf)-P {d2 - Rf)V W^ for a (m - Rf) + P {d2 - Rf) < 0， 
(5.3) 
[a (rfi - Rf) + p {U2 - Rf)r W^ for a � - R f ) P …2 - Rf) > 0, 
Udu = 
- A [ - a (rfi — Rf) - 13 {U2 - RfW W^ for a � + ^ (U2 — Rf) < 0’ 
(5.4) 
Um = - A ( - a - R f ) - ^ - R f ) y W l (5.5) 
where Uuu,Uud,Udu and Udd represent the value gain/loss in the states ('^1,^2), 
(ui, d2), (di,U2) and (<^1,^ 2) respectively. 
Hence, the expected utility is given by: 
B ll/ag,re,ation (^2)] = ^ { ( 1 + p) Uuu + (1 — rf U d^ + (1 " Udu + ( l + rf Udd} 
(5.6) 
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The full static optimization problem ( SP ) for one mental account is specified 
by： 
m y E [Uaggregation ( ^ 2 ) ] (5 .7) 
ot,P 
S.t W2 = + + (1 - a - H / ) W^l 
5.4 Two Mental Accounts 
In the case with two mental accounts, the investor is free to choose account segrega-
tion or aggregation. The progress purely depends on the resulting utility level. For 
the case of mental account segregation, the investor compares his gain and loss for 
each stock with the buying price of that stock, and then constructs two accounts to 
calculate his overall utility. While for the case of mental accounts aggregation, the 
investor computes his total gain and loss with reference to his initial wealth level, 
which is essentially identical to single mental account case. 
The gain/ loss in account A or account J5 is as follows, respectively, 
W2A - a R f W i = l a ( R i - R f ) ] W i , (5 .8) 
W 2 B - ( ^ R f W i = [ ^ { R 2 - R f ) \ W i . (5 .9) 
In mental accounting segregation, the utilities associated with different com-
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binations are as follows: 
S—Uuu = { l o c { u , - R f ) y - \ - [ p { u 2 - R f ) V } W；^, (5.10) 
S-Uud = {[a (m - R f ) y - A {d2 - WJ, (5.11) 
SJJdu = { - A [ - a (di - R f ) y + [U2 - R f W } (5.12) 
S—Udd = - A { [ - a {di - Rf)y + 1-/3 {d2 - Rf)Y} WJ. (5.13) 
Because of the flexibility to choose the way of mental accounting, the investor 
chooses the number of mental accounts that maximizes his value judgement. The 
expected utility is different from the case with one mental account and is given by 
(5.14): 
' � 
1 (1 + Max [Uuu, SJJuu] + (1 - p) Max [t/^, S _Uud] 
-A - - > 
+ (1 — yo) Max [Udu, SJJdu] + (1 + rf Max [Udd, SJJdd] 
(5.14) 
The full static optimization problem ( SP ) for two-mental-account is specified 
by: 
max E [Uny^id ( W 2 ， W - . B ) ] (5.15) 
S.t. W2A = aRiWi, 
W2S = “ / W l ’ 
W2 = (aRi + ^R2 + (l-a-/3) Rf) m. 
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Example 5.1 In order to better explain this kind of mental accounting behavior, 
let's consider a simple example. 
Assume the value function's parameters are (A, 7) = (2，0.8)，and the market 
parameters are : Ui = 1.2，di = 0.9，U2 = 1.4, c?2 = 0.8，Rf = 1.02,/? = 0. For an 
investor with initial wealth Wi = 100 and investment decision (a,/?) = (0.5,0.5), 
the wealth level in account A and B are shown below. 
W2A W2A - aRfWi W2B-PRfWi 
up 60 70 up 9 19 
down 45 40 down - 6 —11 
The gain/ loss {W2 — R/Wi) has the following distribution. In the table, each 
state has the same probability to occur because the two assets are not correlated. 
W2 — RfWi 52 -move 
Up Down 
'S'l-move Up 28 - 2 
Down 13 - 1 7 
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For single mental account, by using (5.2)-(5.5), the utilities are given by: 
Uuu = (28)° ® - 14.379 
Uud = - 2 * � 0 . 8 = - 3 . 4 8 2 
Udu = (13 广8 = 7.783 
Udd = - 2 * (17)0.8 = —19.293 
Hence, the expected utility can be calculated by (5.6). 
E [Uaggregation (W2)] = ^ {i/uu + Uud + Udu + Udd] = -0.153. 
For two mental accounts, by using (5.10)-(5.13), the utilities are given by: 
SJJuu = (9)08 + (19)08 = 16.343 
SJJud = (9 )� . 8 -2* (11 )� . 8 = —7.819 
S—Udu = - 2 氺（6)0-8+ (19)0-8 = 2.158 
S—Udd = _2 * (6)0.8 — 2 * (11)0.8 = —22.005 
Applying equation (5.14), we have: 
> 
1 Max [14.379,16.343] + Max [-3.482, -7.819] 
• E[UF,Y,RID{^2,W2A,W2B)] = \ > 
-\-Max [7.783,2.158] + Max [-19.293’ -22.005] 
= 0 . 3 3 8 . 
It can be observed that {a, (3) = (0.5,0.5) generates a negative expected 
utility for the case of single mental account. On the other hand, the expected utility 
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based on the portfolio allocation (o；,/?) = (0.5,0.5) is positive when the investor is 
allowed to have mental account segregation. In this example, mental accounting 
effect is significant. 
5.5 Numerical results 
We use the following market parameters: ui = 1.2, di = 0.9，U2 = 1.4, d] = 0.8 
and Rf = 1.02 to generate numerical solutions. The following tables show the 
investment behaviors with different values of parameters (A, 7). In the tables, EU 
and EW denote the expected utilities and expected wealth, respectively; a, /3 and 
TT {tt = a p) correspond to the investment in risky asset 1，risky asset 2 and the 
total risky position, respectively. 
Prom the tables, we can see that the freedom to have two mental accounts 
does encourage the risky investment. The expected utilities and expected wealth are 
higher in the case with two mental accounts. Firstly, Figure 5.1，which has the value 
function parameters suggested by the prospect theory (A = 2.25,7 = 0.88), suggests 
that the mental accounting does not create a very high investment incentive. In 
Figure 5.2 (A = 2.25,7 = 0.6), mental accounting plays a more important role in 
boosting risky investment. Finally, Figure 5.3 (A = 2,7 = 0.6) demonstrates that, 
investors with flexibility in mental accounting benefit most in the situations with 
high risk aversion and low loss aversion. 
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It is justified to use different values of (A, 7) that deviate from the one sug-
gested by the prospect theory. The degree of loss aversion and risk aversion vary 
among individuals. Psychological experiments are conducted in many countries, and 
the results support our argument. Prom an analysis of a game named "Deal or No 
Deal", the results demonstrate that the risk averse coefficient can be as low as 0.5. 
On the other hand, we can see that even the expected return of S2 is higher 
than S"i，its greater downside risk is not favorable for the investor. Therefore, in 
general, the investor puts a large portion of his wealth into Si. 
One mental Account Two mental Account = 
rho EU EW alpha beta pi EU EW alpha beta pi ‘ 
-1 0.070152 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.070152 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.9 0.063071 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.063722 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.8 0.055991 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.057291 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.7 0.04891 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.05086 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.6 0.041829 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.044429 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.5 0.034748 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.037998 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.4 0.027667 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.031567 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.3 0.020586 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.025137 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.2 0.013505 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.018706 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.1 0.006424 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.012275 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
0 0 1.02 0 0 0 0.005844 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
0.1 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.2 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.3 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.4 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.5 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.6 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.7 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.8 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.9 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
1 0 1.02 0 0 0 I 0 g 0 0 
Figure 5.1: Different trading strategies under mental accounting segrega-
tion/aggregation with different asset correlations (A = 2.25,7 = 0.88) 
68 
One mental Account Two mental Account 
""“rho EU EW alpha beta pi EU EW alpha beta pi = 
-1 0.157674 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.157674 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.9 0.142199 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.145707 1.07 0.6 0 4 1 
-0.8 0.126723 1.07 0.6 0,4 1 0.133741 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.7 0.111248 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.121774 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.6 0.095773 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.109808 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.5 0.080298 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.097842 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.4 0.064823 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.085875 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.3 0.049348 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.073909 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.2 0.033873 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.061942 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.1 0.01902 1.062 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.049976 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
0 0.004549 1.062 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.038009 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
0.1 0 1.02 0 0 0 0.026043 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
0.2 0 1.02 0 0 0 0.014444 1.062 0.6 0.3 0.9 
0-3 0 1.02 0 0 0 0.003209 1.062 0.6 0.3 0.9 
0.4 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.5 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.6 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.7 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.8 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.9 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
Figure 5.2: Different trading strategies under mental accounting segrega-
tion/aggregation with different asset correlations (A = 2.25，7 = 0.6) 
One mental Account Two mental Account “ 
rho EU EW alpha beta pi EU EW alpha beta pi = 
-1 0.157674 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.157674 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.9 0.14428 1.07 0.6 0,4 1 0.147789 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.8 0.130686 1.07 0,6 0.4 1 0.137904 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.7 0.117492 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.128019 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.6 0.104099 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.118133 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.5 0.090705 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.108248 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.4 0.077311 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.098363 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.3 0.063917 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.088478 1,07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.2 0.050524 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.078593 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
-0.1 0.03713 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.068708 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
0 0.023736 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0.058823 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
0.1 0.011028 1.062 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.048938 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
0.2 0 1.02 0 0 0 0.039053 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
0.3 0 1.02 0 0 0 0.029168 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
0.4 0 1.02 0 0 0 0,019283 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
0.5 0 1.02 0 0 0 0.009398 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 
0.6 0 1.02 0 0 0 0.000198 1.059 0.5 0.3 0.8 
0.7 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.8 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.9 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
1 0 1 . 02 0 0 0 0 1 .02 g g o 
Figure 5.3: Different trading strategies under mental accounting segrega-
tion/aggregation with different asset correlations (A = 2,7 = 0.6) 
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Prospect tbeoiT results 
The table show's the estimation results of pro«>pect theory for our sample of 151 contestants from 
The Netherlands (51), Germany (47) and the United States (53). Shown are maximum likelihood 
estimators for the loss aversion (A) and curvature (a) of the value function, the three parameters of 
the reference point model 色，达 and 终，and the noise parameter a. Tlie table also shows the 
overall mean log-Iikelihood (MLL), the likelihood ratio (LR) relative to tht naive model of risk 
neutrality, die percentage of correctly predicted "Deal or No Deal" decisions (Hits), and the total 
number of "Deal or No Deal" decisions in the sample (No.). P-valuM are shown in brackets. 
Netherlands Geimaiiy United States 
2.375 (O.OB) 4.501 (0.008) 4.528 (0.001) 
Q- 0.516 (0.000) 0.486 (0.000) 0.836 (0.000) 
dx 0.474 (0.000) 1.09(5 (0,000) 1.163 (0.000) 
di -0.285 (0.000) -0.026 (0.000) 0.031 (0.329) 
-0.028 (0.000) -0.052 (0.000) -0.093 (0.023) 
g 0.345 (0.000) 0.533 (0.000) 0.193 (0.000) 
MLL ‘ - 0 . 3 0 9 -0.303 -0.228 
LR 48.41 (0.000) 27.44 (0.000) 37.28 (0.000) 
Hits 85% 89% 91% 
No. ^ 327 ^ 
Source: Thierry Post (2007) 
Figure 5.4: The loss aversion and risk aversion parameters generated by the game 
"Deal or No Deal" 
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One mental Account Two mental Account 
rho EU EW alpha beta pi Ell EW alpha beta pi = 
-1 0.157674 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0 1.02 0 0 0 
-0.9 0.14428 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0 1.02 0 0 0 
-0.8 0.130886 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0 1.02 0 0 0 
-0.7 0.117492 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0 1.02 0 0 0 
-0.6 0.104099 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0 1.02 0 0 0 
-0.5 0.090705 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0 1.02 0 0 0 
-0.4 0.077311 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0 1.02 0 0 0 
-0.3 0.063917 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0 1.02 0 0 0 
-0.2 0.050524 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0 1.02 0 0 0 
-0.1 0.03713 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0 0.023736 1.07 0.6 0.4 1 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.1 0.011028 1.062 0,6 0.3 0.9 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.2 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.3 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.4 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.5 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.6 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.7 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.8 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
0.9 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 
1 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 1.02 g 0 0 
Figure 5.5: Pessimistic - Different trading strategies under mental accounting seg-
regation /aggregation with different asset correlations (A = 2,7 = 0.6) 
5.5.1 Pessimistic View 
The discussion so far is about an investor makes use of mental accounting to enhance 
his level of satisfaction. However, if the investor is very pessimistic and choose the 
way of mental accounting that minimize his value judgement, the expected utility 
is given by: 
( 
1 {l + p) Min [Uuu, S_Uuu] + (1 - Min S_Uud] 
ElUHybriAW2,W2A.W2B)] = ^l — — > 
+ (1 - p) Min [Udu, S_Udu] + (1 + p) Min [Udd. S_Udd] 
(5.16) 
Figure 5.5 shows that if the investor is pessimistic, the mental accounting 
effect will cause a zero investment. 
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5.6 Summary 
The results derived in this chapter are summarized as follows: 
1. Comparing cases with single mental account and two mental accounts, we 
found that the total investment, TT, is higher in the case with two mental accounts. 
2. Mental accounting does not have a significant impact when two assets 
are negatively correlated. When two risky assets are perfectly negatively correlated, 
according to the Markowitz's mean-variance model, it is possible to construct a 
portfolio with zero variance. In our market setting with a high equity premium, the 
zero variance portfolio has a higher payoff than the risk-free rate. Therefore, the 
investor borrows to invest when the two assets are highly negatively correlated. 
3. Mental accounting plays a more important role when the assets are not 
correlated or positively correlated. When risky assets have a positive correlation 
coefficient, the probability of having large gain/ loss is high. With the flexibility in 
mental accounting, the investor can increase his utility in the case of double gains 
and comfort himself in the case of double losses. 
4. The more risk averse the investor is, the more dominant mental accounting 
effect is. A large risk averse coefficient 7 represents a large curvature of the utility 
function, which in turn favors the use of mental account segregation/ aggregation. 
5. The less loss averse the investor is, the more dominant the mental ac-
counting effect is. 
72 
Therefore, for an investor possessing the value function in prospect theory 
with loss aversion and risk aversion, wealth manager can suggest the use of mental 
accounting to encourage investment. Prom the table, we can see that, under mental 
accounting，not only does the expected utility increases, but also the expected wealth 
level. Empirical studies have showed that the presentation method affects decision 
making. By combining several losses into one big loss and presenting several gains 
separately can be a good way to encourage investment. 
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Chapter 6 
Mental Accounting under 
Friedman-Savage Value Function 
In this chapter, we investigate the effects of mental accounting under the Priedman-
Savage value function in the following form, 
VG = if W2 > [2， 
AVL = -A(R2-W2Y IIW<W2 < 厂2， （6.1) 
VBL = - [A(r2 - wf + W^] if W2 < w. 
While (6.1) seems not to be exactly the same as the one we used in Chapter 
4 (4.1), they are actually the same with the only difference of a scaling factor. The 
scaling factor simplifies the algebraic calculations and discussions in Chapter 4. In 
this chapter, no analytical solutions can be derived and we will use a computational 
method to get the solution. Therefore, the scaling factor is removed, while 5 is equal 
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Figure 6.1: The best trading strategies for different values of 9 under revised Gomes' 
model 
to 1 — 7 in (4.1). 
We consider the market with one risky asset with the following distribution: 
‘ 
with probability 
i ? = < 
R- with probability 
\ 
Best trading strategy is derived in Chapter 4, and is reproduced here (Figure 
6 .1 ) . 
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6.1 Two Assets with Single mental account 
Here, we use the same market conditions as the one in the previous chapter (Chapter 
5) : There are two risky assets {Si, S2) in the market. 
Risky asset 1 (5i) is characterized by, 
til with probability 
Ri= i 
di with probability 
\ 
Risky asset 2 {S2) is characterized by, 
( 
U2 with probability 
= < 
d2 with probability 
V 




•Si-move Up 0.25 (1 + p) 0.25 (1 - p) 
Down 0.25 (1 - p) 0.25 (1 + p) 
The investor chooses to invest aW\ into S\, into S2 and puts the remain-
ing amount (1 — ot — into the riskless account, which earns him a risk-free rate 
Rf. If a + ^ > 1, the investor borrows money from the riskless account to invest. 
The portfolio return is thus given by: 
W2 = (aRi +jdR2 + (l-a-j3) Rf) M^i. (6.2) 
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With the Friedman-Savage value function, we would like to investigate the 
trading behavioral when there are two risky assets and one risk-free account in 
the market. When there are two risky assets in the market, under the traditional 
finance, investor is likely to prefer the one with a higher reward-to-variability ratio 
-Sharpe Ratio*. The Sharpe ratio/ Sharpe index/ Sharpe measure is a measure of 
the excess return (or Risk Premium) per unit of risk in an investment asset or a 
trading strategy. The Sharpe ratio can be calculated by: 
SR =,丑[凡—丑 d , (6.3) 
^JVar [ R - R f ) 乂 
where R is the asset return, Rf is the return on a benchmark (in our case, it is the 
risk free rate of return), and E[R — Rf] is the expected value of the excess of the 
asset return over the benchmark. 
In our discussion, Rf is constant. Therefore, (6.3) can be simplified to: 
SR = (6.4) 
a 
where a is the standard deviation of the risky asset. 
Concerning the value function, from the result of Chapter 5, we know that 
a combination of low loss aversion and high risk aversion induces significant mental 
accounting effects. In order to facilitate an observation of a clear pattern, we set 
the parameters in the value function as follows: (A = 2,7 = 0.6). 
•This ratio was developed by William Forsyth Sharpe in 1966. 
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The full static optimization problem ( SP ) can be now specified by: 
maxE{V[W2,r2 ] } (6.5) 
OCY/3 
s.t, W2 = (aRi +j3R2 + (l-a-j3) Rj) W^i 
r2 = (1 - 9) RfTi + 9RfW, 
6.1.1 Different Sharpe ratios 
First, we consider two assets with different Sharpe ratios. The market parameters 
are as follow: ui = 1.2，di = 0.9, U2 = 1.4, 6,2 = 0.8 and Rf — 1.02. The calculated 
Sharpe ratios of the two assets are SR\ — 0.2 and SR2 = 0.267. Therefore, the 
investor is expected to prefer risky asset 2 because of its higher reward-to variability 
ratio. Figures 6.2-6 plot the investment level a, /3 and a + against initial wealth 
under different asset correlations. The y-axis represents the percentage of total 
initial wealth invested in S2 and the combined investment, a, (5 and a + 
respectively. 
The expected utilities of different portfolio allocations are generated by plug-
ging in different values of a and ^ and the maximum borrowing is limited as 10 
times of the initial wealth, 
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Q = 0,0.1,0.2，...,10， 
13 = 0,0.1,0.2,...,10, 
a + P < 1 0 . 
The highest utility level is recorded and the corresponding values of a and 
{3 are the best trading strategy under that particular initial wealth. The optimal 
values of A, {3 and CK + are plotted against the initial wealth. 
For two perfectly negatively correlated assets [p = - 1 ) , the investor will in-
vest as much as possible with different combinations of the assets. Here, we limited 
the maximum borrowing at ten times of the original wealth. 
For p = —0.5, 0 and 0.5，the investor will choose a higher portion of S\ in 
most wealth levels because the high expected return of Si is not enough to override 
its high downside risk. It can be observed that as the correlation coefficient increases, 
the total investment at each wealth level decreases because of the loss aversion. 
For example, at Wi = 25, the value of a + ^ decreases from 6.5，6.2 to 5.6 as the 
correlation coefficient increases from —0.5’ 0 to 0.5. When the assets are likely to 
move in the same direction, the investor will have a higher probability to face double 
losses and he will try to minimize the chance of having a high disutility by reducing 
investment amount. 
For the perfectly positively correlated assets, the investor invests in one asset 
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Figure 6.2: The best trading strategy under two risky assets with different Sharpe 
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Figure 6.5: The best trading strategy under two risky assets with different Sharpe 
Ratio - Single Mental Account {p = 0.5) 
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Figure 6.6: The best trading strategy under two risky assets with different Sharpe 
Ratio - Single Mental Account (/? = 1) 
only - the risky asset 2 (5*2) • Only in this case, the investor follows the general 
accepted rule - to invest in the asset with a higher rewaxd-to-variability ratio. In this 
case, the total investment is the lowest among situations with different correlation 
coefficient. 
6.1.2 Same Sharpe ratio 
In order to investigate the case with the same Sharpe ratio for both risky assets, we 
use the following market conditions: Ui = 1.2，di = 0.9，U2 = 1,35, d] = 0.8 and 
Rf = 1.02. The calculated Sharpe ratios of the two assets are SRi = SR2 = 0.2. In 
the traditional finance, the investor should be indifference of the two assets. Figures 
6.7-11 show the optimal portfolios in different cases. 
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Figure 6.7: The best trading strategy under two risky assets with same Sharpe Ratio 
-Single Mental Account (p = —1) 
For two perfectly negatively correlated assets, the investor will invest as much 
as possible with different combination of the assets. The pattern of the demand 
function is preserved. The solution is same as the case with different reward-to-
variability ratios. 
For p = —0.5’ 0 and 0.5, because of the loss aversion, the investor will choose 
a higher portion of risky asset 1 in most wealth levels. However, the pattern is 
distorted and less clear than the previous case. In general, when the correlation 
between assets increases, the total investment a + ^ at each wealth level decreases. 
For the perfectly positively correlated assets {p = 1), the solution is different 
from the pervious case. The investor chooses to invest in both assets, but still with a 
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Figure 6.10: The best trading strategy under two risky assets with same Sharpe 
Ratio - Single Mental Account (p = 0.5) 
with different correlation coefficients. 
6.2 Two Assets with two mental accounts 
In Chapter 5，we know that under the value function in prospect theory, men-
tal accounting can affect the trading patterns and encourage investment in some 
situations. In this chapter, we investigate the effect of mental accounting under 
Friedman-Savage utility function. 
The market conditions are the same as in the previous section (i.e., 2 risky 
assets with different expected returns and variances). With two mental accounts, 
the investor is free to choose accounts segregation or aggregation. The investment 
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Figure 6.11: The best trading strategy under two risky assets with same Sharpe 
Ratio - Single Mental Account {p = 1) 
decision making process purely depends on the expected utility under the Friedman-
Savage utility function. For the case of mental accounts segregation, the investor 
compares his gain and loss for each stock with the buying price of that stock, and 
then constructs two accounts to calculate his overall utility. While for the case of 
mental accounts aggregation, the investor computes his total gain and loss with 
reference to his initial wealth level, which is actually identical to the single mental 
account case. 
6.2.1 Segregation or Aggregation 
In this section, the investor is allowed to choose mental accounting segregation or 
aggregation. We assume that the investor is allowed to have one mental account 
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or two mental accounts according to different investment outcomes. For the one 
mental account situation, the value of utility is the same as the one in the case with 
only one mental account. 
However, in cases with two mental accounts, we assume that the investor not 
only divides his wealth into two different portions proportionately, but also reduces 
the reference point and disaster level proportionately with the mental accounts. It 
is because dividing the wealth only will result in a weird situation: the investor's 
utility decreases tremendously because it is very likely that, after dividing into two 
portions, he will have two accounts which still possess the same high reference point 
and high disaster level as in the original one account. 
In order to better explain this kind of segregation, we can treat this case 
as a parent company that has a fixed capital budget and wants to invest into two 
subsidiaries - subsidiary A and B. After the investment, each subsidiary has their 
own balance sheet and income statement. Thereafter, the parent company can 
choose to value the investment returns jointly by consolidation, or separately by 
treating them as two economic entities. 
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Account A Account B 
Investment aWi pWi 
Cash & ( l — a — 
Reference Point ^ F i (= r^ ^O ^ T , ( 三 T^B) 
Disaster Level ^ ^ W ( � lE^J 击 I Z ( � iEsB) 
We can see that the sum of the two reference points in the two accounts is 
equal to the initial reference point and the sum of disaster levels in the two accounts 
is equal to the initial disaster level. Also, after investing aWi and /3Wi into the 
two subsidiaries, the parent company will divide the remaining cash proportionately 
into two and put them into account A and B, respectively. If a + > 1, the parent 
company is borrowing money from the bank to invest, and adding the liability to 
the two subsidiaries proportionately at the same time. 
The terminal wealth in accounts A and B will be: 
W2A = + (6.6) 
W2S = ( m + Rf) Vt^ i. (6.7) 
V a-hp J 
We can easily verify that W2A + = W2. 
The value function associated with each mental account (^ 4 and B) can be 
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calculated by: 
= {W2A-r2A)' if > 1\4， 
= = -X{r2A-W2AY i f VZ2.I < W2A < r2A, 
VbL_A = - [mA-W^AY + 1 ^ 2 7 ] if 州 < 
(6.8) 
( 
VG_D = {W2B-R2BY if W2B > r2B, 
二 AVZ,_B = -X {r2B-W2BY if < 购 S < 厂2仏 
VBL_B = - [X{T2B-W2BY + IF < 
(6.9) 
Because of the arbitrary choice of mental accounting, the investor decides 
the number of mental accounts which maximizes his value judgement. The expected 
utility is thus different from the case with only single mental account and is given 
by： 
‘ > 
(1 + P) Max [Uuu. S_VA {W2A M ) + S_Vs {W2B (^2))] 
1 +(l-p) Max [UUD, S_VA {W2A M ) + S_VB {W2B W^))] 
E [Umixed] = T < ^ 
+ (1 - p) Max [UDU, S_VA {W2A � ) + J B {W2B 
+ (1 + p) Max [UDD, S_VA {W2A ⑷)）+ S_VB {W^B (而))] 
(6.10) 
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The objective function for this problem is: 
E {Umi.,d[W2A, W2’ r2A, T 2 B . K 2 B , K ] } (6.11) 
W2 + W2B, 
Fz = (1 - 0) RfFi + ORfWi. 
6.2.2 Numerical results 
The same numerical procedure in the previous section is adopted here. In our 
numerical tests, we use ui = 1.2，di = 0.9, U2 = 1.4, d � = 0 . 8 and Rf = 1.02 to 
generate numerical solutions. The calculated Sharpe Ratios of the two assets are 
Si = 0.2 and S2 = 0.267, respectively. Therefore, we would expect that the investor 
prefers risky asset 2 because of its higher reward-to-variability ratio. Figures 6.12-16 
show the investment level with different asset correlations. 
For two perfectly negatively correlated assets (p = -1)，the investor will in-
vest as much as possible with different combinations of the assets. The solution is 
the same as the case with only one mental account. 
For p = -0 .5 , 0 and 0.5，because of the loss aversion, the investor will choose 
a higher portion of risky asset 1 in most wealth levels. When comparing with one 
mental account, it is clear that the total investment (a + /?) is higher. 
For the perfectly positively correlated assets {p = 1), the solution with two 
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Figure 6,13: The best trading strategy under two risky assets with different Sharpe 
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Figure 6.16: The best trading strategy under two risky assets with different Sharpe 
Ratio - Two Mental Accounts (p = 1) 
risky assets with different Sharpe Ratios different from the case of only one mental 
account. The investor chooses to invest in both assets, but still with a higher portion 
in risky asset 2. The total investment is the lowest among situations with different 
correlation coefficients. However, the effect of mental accounting is most significant 
in this case - the demand of risky assets increases substantially when comparing 
with other situations. 
6.3 Summary 
In our two-risky-asset model, the characteristics of the trading behavior can be now 
summarized as follows: 
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1. Investors may prefer an asset with lower Sharpe Ratio - Si, which is 
inconsistent with the general belief. 
2. The demand functions largely depend on the correlation coefficients. As 
the correlation increases, the investor preference switches from Si to S2. 
3. Similar to our revised Gomes' model, the demand function depends on 
the surplus wealth. Under different surplus levels, the demands of Si and S2 are 
completely different. Investor is changing his preference with the surplus wealth 
level. 
Under this two-risky-asset framework, we redo the mental accounting analysis 
with the Friedman-Savage value function. Our result is consistent with Chapter 5， 
in which mental accounting under the value function in prospect theory is discussed. 
The major effects of mental accounting segregation/ aggregation are listed below. 
1. Comparing the one-mental-account and two-mental-account cases, the 
total investment (a + /3) is higher in the case of two mental-account. 
2. Mental accounting does not have a significant impact when the two assets 
are negatively correlated. 
3. Mental accounting plays a more important role when the assets are not 
correlated or positively correlated. When the risky assets have a positive correlation 
coefficient, the probability of having large gain/ loss is high. With the flexibility in 
mental accounting, the investor can increase his utility in the case of double gains 
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and comfort himself in the case of double losses. 
Therefore, for an investor possessing the Friedman-Savage value function, 
wealth manager can suggest the use of mental accounting to encourage investment. 
By combining several losses into one big loss and presenting several gains separately 




If you don't know who you are, stock market is an expensive place to find o u t . -
Adam Smith, The Money Game. 
When helping their clients to construct the investment portfolios, investment 
advisors and wealth managers are often bemused by their client's decision-making 
processes [28 . 
In general, the portfolio management consists of three steps: 
1. Determine the objectives and constraints for a specific investor. Objectives 
are related to the risk and return expectations of the investor. Constraints are those 
factors that limit or restrict certain decisions or investment choices. 
2. Evaluate the economic environment. Consider these macro issues dealing 
with the overall state of the economy (e.g., growth prospects, inflation expectations, 
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equity premium etc.) 
3. Create an asset allocation plan. Portfolio decisions are implemented and 
executed in a timely fashion so that the investor's funds can be invested to attain 
goals and objectives. 
According to Kahneman and Riepe [12], financial advising is "a prescriptive 
activity whose main objective should be to guide investors to make decisions that 
serve their best interest". Because of the natural psychological preferences, the best 
interest of individuals may not be served best by the output of a mean-variance 
model. From the behavioral finance perspective, the mean-variance portfolio may 
work well for intuitional investors, but fail in regarding psychologically biased indi-
viduals. Therefore, investors may be better served by a portfolio that deviates from 
the efficient frontier. 
Usually, there is a mismatch between the risk and return expectation - in-
vestor demands a high return without taking any risk. Also, investor's willingness to 
take risk may deviate from their ability in coping with risk. Appropriately connect-
ing expectation to ability may require a task of educating the client in risk return 
principle. 
In this research, we deal with three common investor's psychological features, 
namely, 1) Loss Aversion, 2) Risk Aversion, and 3) Mental Accounting. 
We found that the loss aversion seriously affects investor's decision making, 
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causing them to avoid risky investment even there is a high equity premium in the 
market. In Chapter 2，for investors with loss aversion updating, they will eventually 
leave the market because every single loss has a significant impact on their minds. 
Only those winners who have never experienced a loss can enjoy the high equity 
premium in the market. 
In order to combat the substantial loss aversion, from the result of Chapter 
3，wealth managers can encourage their clients to consider a long time horizon. 
This is consistent with our common beliefs - long investment horizon is beneficial 
to investors. For an investor with a very large loss aversion coefficient, educating 
him to recognize the power of time can increase his terminal wealth level, especially 
when his ability to take risk is high while his willingness to take risk is low. 
In Chapter 4，we revise Gomes' model and derive a different demand function 
of risky asset for an investor who possesses the Friedman-Savage utility function 
with loss aversion. We found that, under Gomes' model setting, there exist three 
investment strategies rather than the two strategies suggested by Gomes. The result 
is confirmed by numerical simulation. 
In Chapter 5 and 6，we analyze the effects of mental accounting in investment 
decision making under both the value function in prospect theory and Friedman-
Savage utility function. Under the two-risky-asset setting, the total investment in 
risky assets is higher in the case that twomental-account valuation is allowed. It is 
very difficult for investment advisors to alter the loss aversion and risk aversion of 
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their clients. However, advisors can make good use of mental accounting, which is a 
common cognitive operation, to encourage risky asset investment. Changing clients' 
way to code their gain and loss can substantially reduce the investment hurdles, and 
contributes to a high terminal wealth level. The effect is more dominant when the 
risky assets in the market show positive correlations. 
The final goal of investment, for most individuals, is wealth accumulation. 
The mean-variance model proposes a way of portfolio management based on the risk-
adjusted return. However, the existence of investors' biases may force the portfolio 
to deviate from the optimal one. To sum up, our research analyzes some common 
investment behaviors and studies their adverse effects. We develop the optimal 
asset allocations under different value functions which account for investors' biases, 
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